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Abstract:   A fundamental aspect of society is the exchange and discussion of opinions between individuals, occurring in situations as
varied as company boardrooms, elementary school classrooms and online social media. After a very brief introduction to the established
results of the most fundamental opinion dynamics models, which seek to mathematically capture observed social phenomena, a brief dis-
cussion follows on several recent themes pursued by the authors building on the fundamental ideas. In the first theme, we study the way
an individual′s self-confidence can develop through contributing to discussions on a sequence of topics, reaching a consensus in each case,
where the consensus value to some degree reflects the contribution of that individual to the conclusion. During this process, the individu-
als in the network and the way they interact can change. The second theme introduces a novel discrete-time model of opinion dynamics
to study how discrepancies between an individual′s expressed and private opinions can arise due to stubbornness and a pressure to con-
form to a social norm. It is also shown that a few extremists can create “pluralistic ignorance”, where people believe there is majority sup-
port for a position but in fact the position is privately rejected by the majority. Last, we consider a group of individuals discussing a col-
lection of logically related topics. In particular, we identify that for topics whose logical interdependencies take on a cascade structure,
disagreement in opinions can occur if individuals have competing and/or heterogeneous views on how the topics are related, i.e., the lo-
gical interdependence structure varies between individuals.
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1   Introduction
In the broad area of social network analysis, the topic
of "opinion  dynamics" has  received  significant  attention
from the systems and control engineering community over
the  past  decade.  Opinion  dynamics  is  the  development
and analysis of dynamical models that capture how indi-
viduals in  a  social  network  interact  and  exchange  opin-
ions;  an  individual's  opinion  may  evolve  over  time  as  a
result  of  learning  the  opinions  of  his  or  her  neighbour.
Many opinion dynamics models, including the most popu-
lar ones, are agent-based models where each individual is
represented by an agent and the opinion of an individual
on a topic is represented by a real value, evolving in time.
The network  of  interactions  between  individuals  is  con-
veniently  captured  by  a  graph,  where  a  node  represents
an  individual  whilst  edges  represent  an  interaction
between two individuals.
In 1956, French Jr[1] introduced an agent-based model
of opinion dynamics to study how individuals exerted so-
cial power on each other during interactions in a network.
The model has become known as the French-DeGroot (or
simply  DeGroot[2])  model  and  is  the  fundamental  agent-
based model  of  opinion  dynamics  which  many  sub-
sequent  works,  including  those  discussed  in  this  paper,
build  upon.  The  model  assumes  that  each  individuals'
opinion (which is a real number) evolves over time as he
or  she  integrates  learned  opinion  values  of  his  or  her
neighbours  with  the  individual's  own  opinion  using  a
weighted averaging process (modelled with a difference or
differential equation) to capture the concept of social in-
fluence. (This has in fact led to the term “influence net-
work” as a shorthand description of such a model.) Even-
tually,  a  consensus  is  reached  on  the  opinion  value,  i.e.,
there is agreement across the opinions of all individuals, if
the network satisfies  some connectedness  conditions.  Ex-
perimental validations  of  the  DeGroot  model  are  repor-
ted in [3, 4].
A quite different approach to the DeGroot model, not
analysed in this paper, but which has also provided great
insight is the use of kinetic modelling for describing opin-
ion  dynamics[5–8].  In  this  approach,  ideas  of  statistical
mechanics and the kinetic theory of gases are used as the
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basis for formulating the models; as such the models are
essential  restricted  to  large  scale  networks,  rather  than
say a network comprised of a company's board of direct-
ors. Molecules and velocities, a common ingredient of the
kinetic  models,  are  replaced  by  individuals  and  opinions
in the opinion dynamics models. The well-developed tools
of  statistical  mechanics  such  as  Boltzmann  and  Fokker-
Planck equations have their analogues, and often analyt-
ic determination  of  limiting  (time  going  to  infinity)  val-
ues can be determined. Evolution of opinions can be mod-
elled  through  diffusion  or  modelling  opinion  exchange
(and  associated  modification)  between  agents.  (We  note
that  diffusion  models  are  examined  in  some detail  in  [9]
also,  distinguishing  types  such  as  information  cascade,
linear threshold and epidemic, and their use for influence
maximization and  information  source  detection  is  ex-
plored).  It  is  important  to  note  that  through  a  series  of
developments,  the  models  of  [5–8]  can  be  given  greater
sophistication through, e.g., inclusion of leadership attrib-
utes,  the  identification  and  use  of  highly  connected
agents, mechanisms for the creation and destruction of in-
teractions, and the inclusion of stubborn agents. (Such re-
finements may  well  be  mirrored  also  in  certain  refine-
ments of the DeGroot model.)
Acknowledging  that  for  larger  and  larger  networks,
agent-based models may be less and less appropriate, we
nonetheless turn to examining some developments of the
DeGroot  model.  Smaller  networks  are  still  of  significant
interest, as many small deliberative groups make import-
ant decisions, e.g., jury panels, government cabinets, and
company  board  of  directors.  Beyond  a  model  capturing
simple  consensus,  variations  of  the  DeGroot  model  have
been proposed to investigate how different social phenom-
ena may arise, often by adjusting the agent dynamics to
capture some additional aspect involved in an individual's
learning  and  assimilating  of  learned  opinions;  the  aim is
to better capture real world networks, where there is of-
ten a diverse range of opinions on a given topic. The Heg-
selmann-Krause  model[10–15] captured  homophily  using
bounded  confidence,  where  an  individual  interacts  only
with those  others  who have similar  opinions.  Over  time,
individuals can become separated into clusters of discon-
nected subgraphs,  where  the  final  opinions  are  the  same
within each cluster, but, different between the clusters.
Polarisation, in which the network separates into two
clusters  of  opposing  opinions,  has  been  heavily  studied.
The Altafini  model  used  negative  edge  weights  to  intro-
duce the idea of antagonistic interactions among individu-
als who may,  for  any number  of  reasons,  dislike  or  mis-
trust each other[16–19]. If the network is “structurally bal-
anced”[20] and satisfies  appropriate  connectivity  condi-
tions, the opinions can become polarised into two oppos-
ing clusters. Other models incorporating negative interac-
tions  include  [21–23]. Polarisation  has  also  been  attrib-
uted to an individual's propensity for biased assimilation
of information sources[24].
The majority of the above mentioned models capture
weak diversity[21, 23], where there is no difference between
opinions in the same cluster. At the same time, there has
been a growing interest to study models which are able to
capture  strong  diversity[21, 23], which  is  frequently  ob-
served  in  the  real  world.  In  such  scenarios,  the  opinions
eventually converge  to  a  configuration  of  persistent  dis-
agreement,  with  a  diverse  range  of  opinion  values  (and
there  may  be  clusters  of  opinions  with  similar,  but  not
equal, values within a cluster).  One is particularly inter-
ested  in  strong  diversity  in  social  networks  that  retain
some form of connectivity over time; it is rare to see real-
world  networks  with  eventually  completely  disconnected
subgroups,  as  arises  in  the  Hegselmann-Krause  models.
One  particular  high-level  question  suggesting  itself  is:  If
social influence is acting to bring opinions closer together,
then what other process that must be at work in connec-
ted networks to generate strong diversity?
Mäs et al.[21, 23] consider two features. The first is “so-
cial  distancing”,  in  which  individuals  place  a  negative
weight on opinion values which they consider are too dif-
ferent from their own; the key difference to the antagon-
istic  weights  in  the  Altafini  model  is  that  [21, 23] con-
sider  weight  magnitudes  which  depend  on  differences  in
opinions, whereas the Altafini model assumes constant, or
time-varying  (but  state-independent)  negative  weights.
The  second  is  to  capture  an  individual's  “desire  to  be
unique”, where  a  state-dependent  noise  grows  in  mag-
nitude as the individual's opinion grows closer to the av-
erage  opinion  of  the  network.  Amelkin  et  al.[25] assumes
an individual's  susceptibility  to  interpersonal  influence is
dependent on the individual's current opinion;  strong di-
versity  can  then  arise,  but  only  in  a  special  case  of  the
model. The Friedkin-Johnsen model shows that strong di-
versity may occur due to an individual's stubborn attach-
ment (which can vary in level of intensity) to his or her
initial  opinion[26].  The Friedkin-Johnsen model is  notable
amongst existing opinion dynamics models in that it has
been  extensively  verified  via  laboratory  experiments  for
small  networks[27–29] and  in  a  quasi-field  experiment  for
medium-sized  networks[30].  An  extension  to  capture  the
simultaneous discussion of multiple logically interdepend-
ent topics was introduced in [31], and used to analyse the
US population's shifting opinions regarding the 2003 US-
led invasion of Iraq[32].
Rather  than  providing  a  broad  survey  of  all  existing
opinion dynamics works (for which[33–35] are suitable), we
present  a  narrower  and  more  detailed  focus,  allowing
more  reflective  discussions.  In  particular,  this  paper  will
introduce and summarise a set of very recent works which
extend  the  DeGroot  and  Friedkin-Johnsen  models  in
three different and significant directions. First, we review
other existing work on the recently introduced DeGroot-
Friedkin model[36] and summarise several advances on the
analysis  of  the  model  made  by  [37–39].  The  DeGroot-
Friedkin model considers a social network that discusses a
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sequence  of  topics,  with  each  discussion  occurring  using
the DeGroot model  dynamics.  An issue of  significant in-
terest is the evolution of individual social power, which is
the  amount  of  weight  that  an  individual  accords  his  or
her own opinion during the discussion process. Evolution
occurs  when  one  discussion  topic  is  finished  and  before
another begins. According to the DeGroot-Friedkin mod-
el,  an  individual's  social  power  changes  at  the  end  of  a
discussion of one topic depending on how much influence
he or  she  has  in  determining the  outcome of  the  discus-
sion; as expected, an individual's social power increases or
decreases as  his  or  her  influence  on  the  discussion  in-
creases or decreases, respectively.
Second, we present a novel opinion dynamics model to
examine  how  discrepancies  in  the  expressed  and  private
opinions  of  the  same  individual  can  arise.  The  fact  that
an individual  can hold a private opinion different to the
one he or she expresses within a social setting is well es-
tablished  in  the  social  sciences[40–42]. It  is  perhaps  a  re-
markable fact that up to now, almost all opinion dynam-
ics  models  assume  that  each  individual  holds  a  single
opinion  per  topic  (some  models  assume  an  individual
holds multiple opinions on multiple topics but each topic
has  only  one  opinion  associated  with  it).  The  proposed
model,  termed the  expressed  and private  opinion  (EPO)
model, assumes  that  each  individual  has  a  separate  ex-
pressed  and  private  opinion  that  evolve  separately.  The
individual's private opinion evolves  according to a modi-
fied  Friedkin-Johnsen  model,  while  his  or  her  expressed
opinion is distorted from his or her private opinion by a
pressure  to  conform  to  the  average  expressed  opinion
(which represents a group standard or norm). We provide
extensive  literature  support  for  the  model,  then  review
the convergence results and analysis of the limiting opin-
ion  distribution.  In  particular,  we  highlight  several  new
and insightful  conclusions  and  the  associated  interpreta-
tions in the sociological context. Furthermore, we use the
model to  revisit  two  classical  works  from  social  psycho-
logy:  Asch's  conformity  experiments[40] and  Prentice  and
Miller's  field  experimental  data  on  pluralistic  ignorance
regarding  the  acceptance  of  alcohol  drinking  culture  on
the Princeton University campus[43].
The third direction we study focuses on a network of
individuals  discussing  multiple  logically  interdependent
topics. As an illustration of logically interdependent top-
ics, consider  the  following  two  statements:  1)  gay  mar-
riage should be permitted, and 2) a person's sexual orient-
ation is largely genetically inherited. It is clear that an in-
dividual is likely to see these two matters as logically re-
lated,  so  that  the  individual's  opinion  on  one  may  not
evolve  independently  of  his  or  her  opinion  on  the  other
because of an internal belief system. The term belief sys-
tem is used to connote a set of topics and the logical con-
nections an individual places between the topics[44]. When
a group of individuals interact expressing opinions on lo-
gically interdependent topics, it may be that the input to
the  thinking  process  of  one  individual  from  the  other
group members is consistent with that individual's intern-
al  belief  system,  or  it  may  be  inconsistent.  Roughly
speaking, consensus  is  more  likely  when there  is  consist-
ency. In  this  part  of  the  paper,  we  both  present  a  re-
cently  developed model[31, 32] and also  obtain  conclusions
on  convergence  of  opinions  to  a  steady  state,  including
the question of whether convergence to a consensus actu-
ally occurs, if not for opinions on all topics, then at least
for opinions on at least one.
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organised  as  follows.
Section 2 provides an introduction to fundamental model-
ling  of  opinion  dynamics  and  associated  mathematical
tools  and  results.  Section  3  introduces  the  DeGroot-
Friedkin  model  of  social  power  evolution  and  presents  a
number of new results. Directions for future work are also
commented  upon.  Section  4  introduces  the  novel  EPO
model  and identifies  a  number  of  interesting  phenomena
that  arises  from  study  of  the  model,  and  records  again
directions for  future work.  The treatment of  opinion dy-
namics given logically related topics is treated in Section 5.
Lastly, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2   Modelling of opinion dynamics
n
1n 0n
n n In
Rn ei ei 2 Rn
In this section, we provide the reader with a detailed
introduction to  two  fundamental  models  of  opinion  dy-
namics. To  begin,  we  establish  the  mathematical  nota-
tion to be used in this paper. The -column vector of all
ones  and  zeros  is  given  by  and ,  respectively.  The
 identity matrix is  given by .  The i-th canonical
base unit vector of  is denoted as , i.e.,  has
one in its i-th entry and zeros elsewhere.
A
aij
A
A  0 A > 0
A 2 Rnm
i = 1;    ; n Pnj=1 aij  1Pn
j=1 aij = 1 APn
j=1 aij = 1
Pn
j=1 aji = 1
A 2 Rnn
A (A)
A 2 Rnn i(A) A
We say that  a  matrix  is  nonnegative  (respectively
positive) if all of its entries  are nonnegative (respect-
ively positive). The matrix  is denoted as being nonneg-
ative  and  positive  by  and ,  respectively.  A
nonnegative  matrix  is  said  to  be  row-sub-
stochastic  (respectively  row-stochastic)  if,  for  all
,  there  holds  (respectively
). A matrix  is said to be doubly stochast-
ic  if  and .  The spectral  radius
of a square matrix  is the largest modulus value
of  the  eigenvalues  of ,  and  is  denoted  by .  For  a
matrix ,  denotes  an  eigenvalue  of .  A
useful definition for a certain matrix property is now given.
A k 2 N
Ak > 0
Definition  1.  (Primitivity,  [45]) A  nonnegative
square  matrix  is  primitive  if  there  exists  such
that .
2.1   Graph theory
In this subsection, we introduce graphs and graph the-
ory. A graph is a powerful tool for modelling the network
of  interactions  between  a  group  of  individuals,  and  at
times this paper will use the term "network'' and "graph''
interchangeably.
A 2 RnnFor  a  given  nonnegative  matrix , we  asso-
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G[A] A
ciate  with  it  a  graph ,  where
 is  the  set  of  nodes  of  and  in  the
context of this paper, each node represents an individual
in a population of size . An edge  is in the
set of  ordered edges  if  and only if ,
where  is the (i, j)-th entry of . A self-loop for node
 exists if . The edge  is said to be incoming
with  respect  to  and  outgoing  with  respect  to ,  and
connotes that  learns of some information (typically an
opinion value) from . We do not assume that 
in general,  and thus  is in general a directed graph.
The  neighbour  set  of  is  defined  as 
. A directed path is a sequence of edges of
the  form  where  and
.  Node  is  reachable  from node  if there  ex-
ists a directed path from  to . Moreover, a graph 
is  strongly connected if  and only if  there  is  a  path from
every  node  to  every  other  node[46].  A  graph  is
strongly  connected  if  and  only  if  is  irreducible[46],  or
equivalently,  there  does  not  exist  a  reordering  of  the
nodes  such that  can be expressed as a block triangu-
lar matrix. A directed cycle is a directed path that starts
and  ends  at  the  same  vertex,  and  contains  no  repeated
vertex except  the  initial  (which is  also  the  final)  vertex.
The length of a cycle is the number of edges in the cyclic
path.  A graph is  aperiodic  if  the  smallest  integer  that
divides the length of every cycle of the graph is [45].
Note that any graph with a self-loop is aperiodic. A res-
ult linking  to the primitivity of  is now given.
G[A]
A
Lemma 1. ([45]) The graph  is strongly connec-
ted and aperiodic if and only if  is primitive.
From  results  on  nonnegative  matrices  and,  further,
the Perron-Frobenius theorem[47], we can establish the fol-
lowing result.
G[A] A
uT
1n A
1 = (A) = 1 u
T1n = 1
uT 1n
A
Lemma  2.  (Dominant  eigenvectors) For  a
strongly  connected  graph  with  row-stochastic ,
there  are  strictly  positive  left  and  right  eigenvectors 
and  of  associated  with  the  simple  eigenvalue
.  With  normalisation  satisfying ,
we  call  and  the dominant  left  and  right  eigen-
vectors of , respectively.
2.2   DeGroot and Friedkin-Johnsen models
n
G[A]
i
xi(k) 2 R k = 0; 1;   
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  introduce  the  DeGroot
and Friedkin-Johnsen (which is a powerful generalisation
of DeGroot) models. Consider a population of  individu-
als, whose interactions are modelled by a graph , dis-
cussing  a  single  topic.  Individual  has  an  opinion
,  at  discrete  time  instants , and  ac-
cording to the DeGroot model, evolves as
xi(k + 1) =
nX
j=1
aijxj(k) (1)
aij  0 Pnj=1 aij = 1
A
x = [x1;    ; xn]T
where the influence weights  satisfy ;
this immediately implies that  is nonnegative and row-
stochastic.  In  compact  form,  the  opinions  of  all
individuals, recorded as  evolve as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k): (2)
x(0)
x(1) = 1n;  2 R
G[A]
Convergence of  the  model  has  been  extensively  stud-
ied, and  of  particular  interest  is  convergence  to  a  con-
sensus  of  opinions,  which occurs  if,  for  all , the  sys-
tem (2) converges to . The conditions
for convergence of  (2) are summarised succinctly in [33],
with the  following  result  detailing  conditions  for  con-
sensus on strongly connected .
G[A]
limk!1 x(k) = 1n;
 2 R G[A]
 = Tx(0) T
A
Lemma 3. Suppose  that  is  strongly  connected.
Then, (2) converges to a consensus, 
,  if  and  only  if  is  aperiodic.  Moreover,
, where  is the dominant left eigenvector of
.
xi
[a; b] a; b 2 R xi = a xi = b
xi i
xi
Before  we  move  to  consider  the  Friedkin-Johnsen
model,  we  provide  several  comments  on  the  DeGroot
model. First, defining  as a real number (as opposed to
requiring it to be, say +1 or –1) is useful in a broad range
of applications  scenarios,  and one  might  define  an inter-
val , with , such that  and  rep-
resent  the  two  extreme  views  of  the  opinion  interval1,
while  values  of  in  between  represent  an  individual 
with views of varying conviction. For example, the social
network  may  be  discussing  a  topic  which  is  subjective
(for  which  no  exact  answer  exists),  e.g.,  “was  the  2003
US-led  invasion  of  Iraq  justified?”[32].  Alternatively,  one
could  consider  an  intellective  topic  (provably  true  or
false), e.g., “smoking tobacco damages your lungs”. Other
social  network  models[9, 48–50],  such  as  the  diffusion/
threshold model, define  as a discrete variable, and may
be  more  suitable  for  opinions  that  lead  to  actions,  e.g.,
voting choices for a political election.
Pn
j=1 aij = 1
aij  0 xi(k + 1)
xj(k); j =1;    ; n
aij(k)
Second, we consider only strongly connected graphs in
this paper, even though many results can be extended to
weaker  graph  connectivity  requirements.  This  is  because
the  focus  is  to  advance  the  models  themselves  to  study
new phenomena, and thus strong connectivity serves as a
suitable  and  convenient  assumption  that  can  be  relaxed
for  future  work.  Third,  the constraint  that 
and  implies  that  is a  convex  combina-
tion,  or  weighted  average,  of .  It  turns
out that (1) has been extensively studied as an averaging
algorithm with  application  to  multi-agent  consensus  and
coordination, including with time-varying , see e.g.,
[51–54].
We  conclude  by  introducing  the  Friedkin-Johnsen
x i(0) 2 [a; b]; 8i 2 f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;ng ) x i(k) 2 [a; b]; 8i 2 f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;ng
8k ¸ 0 [¡1; 1] [0; 1]
1Well  constructed  opinion  dynamics  models  (such  as  the
DeGroot  and  Friedkin-Johnsen  models)  have  the  property  that
 and
. Two common intervals are  and .
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nG[A] i
model, which is discussed in further detail in [27, 31, 33, 55].
Again considering a population of  individuals interact-
ing on , individual 's opinion evolves as
xi(k + 1) = i
nX
j=1
aijxj(k) + (1  i)xi(0) (3)
aij
i 2 [0; 1]
1  i i
1  i
xi(0)
i
i = 1 i
i = 0 i
i
where the  have the same constraints as detailed below
(1),  and  is  individual i's  susceptibility  to
influence  (  is  sometimes  termed 's  stubbornness).
Thus,  represents an individual's attachment to his
or  her  initial  opinion ,  and  a  measure  of  the
unwillingness of individual  to accept new information. If
,  then  individual  is  maximally  susceptible  to
interpersonal influence, and we recover (1). On the other
hand,  implies  individual  is  maximally  closed  to
interpersonal influence (in the DeGroot model, this occurs
in the special case where individual  has no neighbours).
Accordingly,  the  compact  opinion  dynamical  system  is
given by
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + (In  )x(0) (4)
 = diag(i)
i = 1; 8i 2 f1;    ; ng
i i < 1
with  being  the  diagonal  matrix  of
susceptibilities.  Notice  that  if  every  individual  is
maximally  susceptible,  i.e., ,  then
from  (4)  we  recover  (2);  for  the  following  result,  we
assume there is at least one individual  with . For
strongly  connected  networks,  the  following  convergence
result is available, summarised from [31].
G[A]
9i; j 2 f1;    ; ng i; j < 1
(In  A) < 1
Lemma 4. Suppose  that  is  strongly  connected,
and  that  such  that .  Then,
 and (4) converges exponentially fast to
lim
k!1
x(k) , x = V x(0): (5)
V , (In  A) 1(In  )
x
x(0)
The  matrix  is  row-
stochastic, and thus each entry of  is a convex combin-
ation of .
9i; j 2 f1;    ; ng i; j < 1 xi(0) 6= xj(0)
i < 1; 8i 2 f1;    ; ng
x(0) xi 6= xj i 6= j
Further to  this  result,  there  is  an  interesting  conclu-
sion related to strong diversity, a concept which was dis-
cussed  in  the  Introduction.  The  Friedkin-Johnsen  model
on  strongly  connected  networks  will  in  general  yield
strong  diversity  of  the  limiting  opinions  whenever
 such that  and .
If  every  individual  has  some  stubbornness,  i.e.,
, then for generic initial conditions
,  there  holds  for  any .  In  other  words,
for  almost  all  initial  conditions,  the  limiting  opinions  of
the individuals  in  the  social  network  display  strong  di-
versity.
Remark 1. The models discussed in this section, and
those that will be introduced in latter parts of this paper,
are  all  discrete-time  models.  Naturally,  continuous-time
counterparts to each model are either available or may be
proposed.  In  particular,  the  Abelson[56] and  Taylor[57]
models are the continuous-time counterparts to the DeG-
root  and  Friedkin-Johnsen  model.  In  many,  but  not  all
instances, the same phenomena that arise in the discrete-
time model,  mutatis  mutandis,  also arise in the continu-
ous-time model.  Thus,  this  paper  will  not  consider  con-
tinuous-time models,  but  the  results  covered in  the  sub-
sequent  parts  of  this  paper  certainly  can  be  studied  in
continuous-time as future work. We expect that many of
the analysis techniques found in the extensive multi-agent
systems literature will  be applicable  for  analysis  of  more
complicated  continuous-time  opinion  dynamics  models,
given their similarity to continuous-time multi-agent con-
sensus algorithms, see e.g., [58, 59].
3   Evolution of social power
S = f0; 1; 2;    g
s 2 S
Suppose an individual is participating in discussion in
a  strongly  connected  network  which  covers  a  number  of
different issues  (topics)  sequentially,  with  the  issues  in-
dexed by the issue sequence .  Under  the
DeGroot model,  each issue  is discussed through to
consensus (because of the strongly connected network, see
Lemma  3),  then  the  next  issue  is  discussed,  and  so  on.
Suppose that the individual perceives during this process
that  they  have  less  and  less  impact  on  the  outcome  of
each discussion.  Consequently,  and  intuitively,  they  be-
come  less  and  less  confident  of  their  own  opinion.  (The
converse  situation  of  having  more  and  more  impact  and
rising confidence can also occur of course). This self-con-
fidence has been termed social power[36], with the reasons
becoming apparent  in  the  sequel,  following  formal  intro-
duction of the model.
aii A
i aii(s)
s 2 S
i xi(k; s) k = 0; 1;   
We  are  thus  interested  in  modelling  how  a  person
evaluates their influence on a discussion, and how the up-
dating of this person's self-confidence affects discussion on
the  next  topic.  We treat  these  matters  in  sequence,  and
first introduce the DeGroot-Friedkin model[36], before cov-
ering several new and major advances. The discussion of
any  one  issue  proceeds  according  to  the  DeGroot  model
(2). We first define , the i-th diagonal entry of  as in-
dividual 's  self-confidence.  We allow  to  change  in
some way to be specified below, and for issue , indi-
vidual 's opinion  evolves for  as
xi(k + 1; s) = aii(s)xi(k; s) + (1  aii(s))
nX
j 6=i
cijxj(k; s)
(6)
aij(s) , (1  aii(s))cij cij  0
s i
j 6= i
cii = 0Pn
j=1 cij = 1 i 2 f1;    ; ng
aii(s) s = 0; 1;   
with .  Here,  is  independent
of  and represents the relative trust individual  accords
to  individual  (we  explain  shortly  why  we  refer  to
this  as  relative  trust).  With ,  we  further  impose
that  for  all .  Thus,  it  is  clear
that as  evolves along the issue sequence 
(in  a  manner  we  will  describe  in  the  sequel),  there
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Pn
j=1 aij(s) = 1 i 2 f1;    ; ng
s 2 S
s 2 S
continues  to  hold  for  all 
and for  all .  In other  words,  the opinion discussion
for each topic  is
x(k + 1; s) = A(s)x(k; s) (7)
with
A(s) = diag(aii(s)) + (In   diag(aii(s)))C (8)
C
cij
s
aii(s)
row-stochastic,  with  the  matrix  formed  from  the
relative trust entries . Thus, the opinion discussion for
any issue  is modelled by the DeGroot process. The focus
of the DeGroot-Friedkin model is to propose a systematic
mechanism for updating , and we address this in the
next subsection.
3.1   Evolution by reflected self-appraisal
s 2 S G[C]
aii(s) < 1 i 9j : ajj(s) > 0 G[A(s)]
A(s)
x(s; k) k !1
9j : ajj(s) = 1 aii(s) < 1
i 6= j G[A(s)]
vj vi; i 6= j vj
G[A(s)]
limk!1 x(s; k) = xj(0)1n
aii(0)
Consider  an  and  that is  strongly  connec-
ted. If  for all  and , then 
with  defined in (8) is strongly connected and aperi-
odic[36, 38]. Thus,  reaches a consensus as  as
per Lemma 3. If instead  and  for
all ,  then  is  such that  there  is  a  path from
node  to  every  other  node  and  has no  in-
coming  edges[36, 38] (in  this  case,  is  not  strongly
connected), and standard consensus results establish that
. In  both  cases  (we  shall  estab-
lish  in  the  sequel  that  for  a  large  and  reasonable  set  of
initial ,  these  are  the  only  two  cases  possible),  we
can write that
lim
k!1
x(k; s) = T(s)x(0; s)1n =
nX
i=1
i(s)xi(0; s)1n (9)
T(s) A(s)
G[A(s)]
T(s) = ejPn
i=1 i(s) = 1 i(s)
i
s
aii
where  is  the  dominant  left  eigenvector  of  if
 is  strongly  connected  and  aperiodic  and
 in  the  latter  case.  From  the  fact  that
,  one  can  see  that  captures  the
relative contribution, termed social power, of individual 
to the discussion of topic . The DeGroot-Friedkin model
proposes  that  each  individual  updates  his  or  her  self-
confidence  using reflected self-appraisal  at  the end of
each topic discussion. Formally, the update is
aii(s+ 1) = i(s) (10)
s+ 1
A(s+ 1) s+ 1 s
s+ 1
i
s
s
and  then  for  the  next  topic ,  the  influence  matrix
 is determined by (8) but with  replacing .
This replacement indicates that for issue , individual
 weights his or her own opinion relative to the opinions
of others by the same weight as his or her contribution to
the consensus  value  in  issue .  It  also  indicates  that  the
nature  of  the  interactions  between  individuals,
discounting  any  self-weighting,  is  constant  with .  If
C(s) s
aii(s+ 1) =
i(s)
aij(s+ 1) = (1  i(s))cij(s)Pn
j=1 aij(s+ 1)
individual  1  finds  individual  2  twice  as  reliable  as
individual 3 for topic 0, that proportionality relationship
will  hold  for  all  issues  if  is  independent  of .
However,  what  does  change  is  the  overall  weight
individual  1  gives  to  all  opinions  other  than  his  or  her
own, since in adjusting the self-weighting to be 
, a compensating adjustment for weighting placed on
others' opinions,  is necessary
to ensure that  remains equal to 1.
i(s)
s = 0; 1; 2;   
G[C]
9j : ajj(0) > 0
aii(0) < 1; 8i 9j : ajj(0) = 1 aii(0) < 1;
8i 6= j
One  key  task  is  to  establish  the  properties  of 
along the sequence of topics . To do this, Jia
et al.[36, 38] showed that if  is strongly connected, and
the  initial  conditions2 satisfied  a)  and
 or  b)  and 
, then
(s+ 1) = F ((s)) (11)
where
F () =
8>>><>>>:
ei; if i = 1 for any i
()
26664
1
1  1
...
N
1  n
37775; otherwise (12)
() =
1
nX
i=1
i
1  i
i
T C
F : n 7! n
n (s) 2 n s > 0
with .  Here,  is  the i-th entry of  the
dominant  left  eigenvector  of .  It  was  also  shown
that  the  map  is  continuous[36] and
smooth[38] on , and that  for all .
3.2   Recent advances in analysis of the De-
Groot-Friedkin model
(s); s  0
Jia et al.[36, 38] established a number of results on the
evolution of the social power vector . We sum-
marise  the  key  convergence  results  in  Theorem  1,  and
then  provide  detailed  discussions  of  various  additional
conclusions of interest. Before doing so, we define a topo-
logy  class  that  has  special  convergence  properties  in  the
DeGroot-Friedkin model.
G[C]
vi
E [C]
vi
Definition  2.  (Star  graph) A  strongly  connected
graph  is called a star graph if and only if there ex-
ists a unique node , called the centre node, from which
every edge in  is either incoming or outgoing with re-
spect to .
n  3
G[C]
Theorem 1. Consider the system in (11), with 
individuals' relative interactions captured by the strongly
connected . Suppose that the initial conditions satis-
Pn
i=1 aii(0) = 1
2The  authors  of  [36]  first  established F for  initial  conditions
satisfying . Our paper[38] showed F also holds for
the more general case stated in this paper.
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9j : ajj(0) > 0 aii(0) < 1; 8ify3  and . Then,
G[C]
v1
lims!1 (s) = e1
ej ; j 6= 1 F
1)  If  is a  star  graph,  whose  centre  node  is  as-
sumed  to  be  without  loss  of  generality,  then
.  Convergence  while  asymptotic  is  not
exponentially  fast.  All  other  fixed  points  of 
are unstable.
G[C] lims!1 (s) = 
 2 int(n)
F en
ej ; j = 1;    ; n F
2) If  is not a star graph, then 
exponentially  fast.  In  particular,  is  the
unique fixed point of the map  in the set . All other
fixed points  of  are unstable.
G[C]
G[C]
F

(s+ 1) = F ((s)
The original proof of convergence in [36] used LaSalle's
invariance  principle  to  establish  asymptotic  convergence
for  both  star  and  non-star . Exponential  conver-
gence for non-star  was first established in [38] using
nonlinear contraction analysis and a set of specialised cal-
culations tailored specifically to the functional form of 
in  (12).  In  the  same  paper,  exponential  convergence  for
star graphs was ruled out.  An alternative proof  of  expo-
nential  convergence  using  a  generalised  Lefschetz-Hopf
result from differential topology, which simultaneously es-
tablished the uniqueness  of ,  was provided in [39]  and
had the virtue of not appealing to the specific functional
form of  (11),  but  requiring certain  topological  properties
of some general update map ).
3.2.1   Analysis of final social power
G[C]

i; j 2 f1;    ; ng j > i
j > i 

j = 

i j = i i
T
G[C] i
For  non-star ,  a  number  of  further  conclusions
can be drawn regarding the fixed point . First, for any
,  there  holds  if  and  only  if
,  and  if  and only if [36].  Here,  is
the i-th  entry  of ,  the  left  dominant  eigenvector  of
.  Clearly,  the  ranking  of  the  (termed eigenvector
centrality in some disciplines),  also determines the rank-
ing of the individuals' final social powers.
i
G[C]
i 2 f1;    ; ng
Actually,  more  can  be  established  from .  In  fact,
when  is not a star graph, we[38] can show that there
holds for any ,
i  i
1  i : (13)
G[C] i  1
3
i
Thus,  we  are  able  to  upper  bound  the  final  social
power  of  any  individual  in  the  network.  For  networks
 with  for all , it is also possible to compute a
bound on the convergence rate, see [38].
 = 1  () 2 (0; 1) 
 < 0:5 i
i > i i >  

i < i i <  

i =  i = 
  0:5 i
i > i j 6= i j < j

An  interesting  result  on  the  accumulation  of  social
power  in  non-star  graphs  was  presented  in  [36].  Define
,  where  was  given  below  (12).
Then,  if ,  there  holds  for  any  individual ,  1)
 if , 2)  if  and  if .
If ,  then  there  is  a  unique  individual  with
, while all other individuals  have . By
viewing  as a threshold value, this result identifies those
i
i
individuals  who  accumulate  more  social  power  than
their share of the centrality measure , and vice versa.
3.2.2   Dynamic relative interaction topology
aii(s)
c1j ; j = 2; 3
G[C(s)] = G[C(s)] (s)
C(s) (s) (s); s  0
The  possibility  of  allowing  more  time-variation  than
that  captured  by  the  is  a  natural  consideration.
Suppose that the group in question is a cabinet of minis-
ters. Each week they might meet and regularly discuss di-
verse  topics,  e.g.,  relating to  defence,  social  security and
the economy. Because of the different expertise of the dif-
ferent ministers, it would be logical for Minister 1 to vary
the  relative  weight  he  or  she  puts  on  the
opinions of Ministers 2 and 3 in discussing topics of a dif-
ferent  character.  Further,  the  composition  of  such  a
group  can  change  over  time;  friendships  may  be  formed
or  broken.  This  leads  to  the  consideration  of
,  where  is  a  switching signal  that
captures the topic-varying nature of  the relative interac-
tion matrix ,  and  is independent of .
Accommodating such  time-variation,  including  the  im-
portant specialisation  of  periodic  time-variation,  is  diffi-
cult, but not impossible. This may appear surprising, giv-
en that the system is now
(s+ 1) = F(s)((s)) (14)
F(s)
i(s) = i;(s) i i 2 f1;    ; ng
G[C(s)]
s
aii(0)
with  defined  similarly  to  that  in  (12)  but  with
 replacing ,  for  all .
Although  (14)  is  a  nonlinear  switching  discrete-time
system, the nonlinear contraction analysis advanced in [38]
for the original dynamics (11) proves apt at handling this.
We establish that, for the system (14) with  being
a  strongly  connected  non-star  graph  for  all  and  initial
conditions  as detailed in Theorem 1, there holds
lim
s!1
(s) = (s) (15)
(s); s  0
C(s) C(s)
(s)

(s)

where  is termed  the  "unique  limiting
trajectory" of  (14)  that  is  determined  solely  by  the
sequence of switching . A special case is when 
changes  periodically,  e.g.,  when  a  cabinet  revisits  the
same set of issues every week; in such instances,  is a
periodic  trajectory.  The  ranking  result  and  threshold
result  with  detailed  in  Section  3.2.1  have  not  been
established  for  dynamic  topology  systems.  However,  and
perhaps  surprisingly,  the  upper  bound  result  (13)  and
convergence  rate  result  detailed  below  (13),  can  be
established  for  networks  with  dynamic  topology  though
with  obvious  adjustments  to  account  for  the  fact  that
convergence occurs to the unique limiting trajectory 
rather than a fixed point .
The key  conclusion  from  study  of  dynamically  chan-
ging relative interaction topology is that sequential opin-
ion  discussion  removes  initial  social  power/self-confid-
ence exponentially fast. True social power/self-confidence
evolving via reflected self-appraisal, obtained in the limit
of the sequence of topic discussions, is dependent only on
the  sequence  of  topology  structures,  i.e.,  the  distinct
9j : ajj(0) = 1 aii(0) < 1; 8i 6= j
8s > 0
3The  case  where  and  leads  to
trivial  dynamics  where ζ (s)  = ej,  and  we  thus  ignore
this.
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6a^ii(0) 6= ~aii(0) i 2 f1;    ; ng
i
i(s)
i (s); s  0
a^ii(0) ~aii(0)
agent-to-agent  interactions.  This  is  clearly  illustrated  in
the  simulation  result,  displayed  in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 shows  a
network  of  individuals discussing  topics  on  a  periodic-
ally changing network. For the same network of individu-
als, we initialise the system with two different sets of ini-
tial  conditions,  for  every 
(both  sets  of  initial  conditions  satisfy  the  hypothesis  in
Theorem 1). For any individual , his or her social power
trajectory  converges to the unique, periodic traject-
ory  regardless  of  the  initial  self-confidence
(dotted line for  and solid line for ). Moreover,
it is clear that the convergence is exponential; by the 8th
topic, both  the  dotted  and  solid  trajectories  have  con-
verged.
3.2.3   Similar time-scales, memory and noise
yi(k; s)
i(s)
aii(s)
i
i(s)
Now,  we  briefly  touch  upon  other  works  which  have
advanced the original DeGroot-Friedkin model. First, the
reader  may  have  noticed  that  by  assuming  the  self-ap-
praisal dynamics  follow  (10),  two  restrictions  are  im-
posed  on  the  social  network.  The  first  is  that  the  time-
scale for opinion evolution  and social power evolu-
tion  are  assumed  to  be  separate.  In  particular,  the
opinion  discussion  occurs  much  faster  than  the  self-ap-
praisal,  and  thus  a  consensus  is  always  reached  before
self-confidence  is updated. Second, (10) implies that
the  updating  is  centralised;  any  individual  knows pre-
cisely his or her relative contribution . This is not a
problem for small to medium sized networks, but may be
less realistic for larger sized networks. A model which re-
laxes  these  two  restrictions,  first  alluded  to  in  [36],  has
been  partially  studied  in  [60, 61] as  the  “modified  DeG-
root-Friedkin model”. A continuous-time counterpart has
also been partially studied in [62]. A full analysis remains
missing,  though  private  communications  with  Professor
Bullo have indicated a more comprehensive result may be
soon forthcoming.
G[C(s)]
C(s)
C
(s)
F C
C(s)
C(s)
Chen et al.[63] has provided a number of different ad-
vances to the original DeGroot-Friedkin model; we briefly
summarise  several  contributions  of  note  here.  Switching
topology  with  general  as  in  Section  3.2.2  is  also
considered,  but with a major restriction that every 
is a small perturbation from some fixed . Perhaps un-
surprisingly given the conclusions in Section 3.2.2, it is es-
tablished  that  approaches  a  ball  around  the  fixed
point  of  with . Convergence  for  the  model,  modi-
fied to incorporate a sequence of stochastic , environ-
ment noise, and in which there is "memory" in the entries
of ,  is  also  established.  However,  the  conditions  for
convergence are  complex  and  in  general  extremely  diffi-
cult to verify.
3.3   Future research directions
We now describe some extensions of the above model-
ling currently under development. Interested readers may
find a number of interesting problems for investigation.
3.3.1   Behaviour in self-appraisal dynamics
The  first  extension  flows  from  the  observation  that
during discussions,  some  individuals  may  be  overconfid-
ent,  other  individuals  may  be  underconfident,  and  other
individuals  again  may  over-react,  either  in  a  positive  or
negative direction to certain outcomes of the discussion.
i(s)
i
s s+ 1
aii(s+ 1)
i
i
i(s)
i()
As above,  is  the social  power or  measure of  the
contribution  individual  makes  to  the  consensus  value
achieved for topic . For topic , the individual's self-
confidence  updates  via  self-appraisal  according
to (10).  However,  in  the extension we propose  that  dur-
ing  this  self-appraisal  process,  an  individual 's  personal
behavioural  characteristics  may  alter  individual 's per-
ception of his or her social  power .  This is  captured
using a function  that is assumed to have the follow-
ing properties.
i 2 f1;    ; ng i(x) : [0; 1]
! [0; 1]
i = 0, x = 0 i = 1, x = 1
Assumption 1. For every , 
 is  a  smooth  monotonically  increasing  function
satisfying  and .
i 2 f1;    ; ng
Then, we propose that the self-appraisal dynamics, for
every individual , becomes
aii(s+ 1) = i(i): (16)
i
i(i) < i (0; 1)
i(i) < 
(0; 1)
i(i) < i (0; a) a 2 (0; 1)
i(a) = a i(i) > i (a; 1)
i(i) = i
F (s)
(s+ 1)
An individual  whose was underconfident, or perhaps
humble, might well have  on , an overcon-
fident  or  arrogant  individual  might  have  on
,  and  an  overly-reactive  or  emotional  individual
might  have  on  for  some ,
 and  on . Finally, a balanced in-
dividual  might  have  (i.e.,  the  original  model
(10)). An example of an "emotional" individual is given in
Fig. 2. This change means that the mapping  from 
to  is modified to become
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i (s); s  0
Fig. 1     Evolution  of  selected  individuals′  social  powers  over  a
sequence of topic discussions for a network of 6 individuals, with
a periodically varying network structure. For each i = 1, 3, 6, the
initial  self-confidence  .  It  can  be  seen  that  for  any
individual  i,  his  or  her  social  power  trajectories  from  different
initial  conditions  (dotted  line  for    and  solid  line  for  )
converge  to  the  same  unique  trajectory  .  (Color
versions of the figures in this paper are available online.)
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F : (s)! (s+ 1) =
1
nP
j=1
j
1  j(j(s))
266664
1
1  1(1(s))
...
n
1  n(n(s))
377775 : (17)
int(n)
Now it is the stability properties of this equation that
need to be analysed. If all individuals are humble or bal-
anced,  there  is  as  previously  a  single  unique  equilibrium
in  which  is  approached exponentially  fast  under
the same initial  conditions as in Theorem 1. However,  if
one or  more  individuals  are  emotional,  multiple  attract-
ive equilibria  can  exist  in  contrast  to  the  original  DeG-
root-Friedkin model where for non-star graphs, there was
a  unique  attractive  equilibrium  with  all  other  equilibria
being unstable.  At  this  stage,  only  preliminary results[64]
establishing the dynamical equations in (17) and conver-
gence for some cases have been obtained.
3.3.2   Self-appraisal with stubborn individuals
G[C]
The reader will likely have noticed that the DeGroot-
Friedkin  model  assumes  that  during  a  discussion  of  any
one  topic,  each  individual's  opinion  evolves  according  to
the DeGroot model  as  described in (1).  Thus,  under the
suitable  connectivity assumption of  a  strongly connected
,  a  consensus  is  always  achieved  for  each  topic.
However, we also introduced the Friedkin-Johnsen model
in (3) and noted that it has been extensively validated in
experiments. Thus, it is natural to consider the evolution
of self-confidence with this model, i.e., the dynamics (10)
but with (6) replaced by
xi(k + 1; s) =
iaii(s)xi(k; s) + i(1  aii(s))
X
j 6=i
cijxj(k; s)+
(1  i)xi(0; s) (18)
i 2 f1;    ; ng s = 0; 1;   
i 2 [0; 1] i
for  every  and ,  and  where
 is  individual 's  susceptibility  to  influence  as
detailed  below  (3).  In  fact,  the  first  reflected  self-
appraisal  model  proposed  by  Noah  Friedkin  in  [65]
considered  (18)  rather  than  (6).  However,  [65]  primarily
focused  on  introducing  the  idea  of  self-appraisal  in
opinion  dynamics  along  a  sequence  of  topic  discussions,
with laboratory experiments and simulations. In fact, the
DeGroot-Friedkin  model  with  stubborn  individuals  has
been  extensively  studied  with  simulations  and  validated
empirically  in e.g.,  [28, 29];  one  particularly  interesting
conclusion  is  that  in  the  limit  of  the  topic  sequence,  a
single  individual  emerges  holding  all  of  the  social  power
even in non-star graphs.
9i; j : i; j < 1
s G[A(s)]
i i
V
(s)T
However,  it  has  proved  challenging  to  theoretically
analyse the dynamics of (10) with the modification as in
(18),  if  at  least  two  or  more  individuals  are  somewhat
stubborn,  i.e., .  For  then,  opinions  do
not  reach  a  consensus  for  topic  even  if  is
strongly  connected,  as  identified  below  Lemma  4.  Thus,
there  is  no  convenient  expression  of  the  contribution  of
individual  using  as in (9). One method is to use the
matrix ,  see  Lemma 4,  which  for  a  single  topic  is  the
mapping  from  the  initial  opinions  to  the  final  opinions.
Thus, the equivalent of  in (9) is set to be
(s) = n 1V (s)T1n (19)
V (s) = (In  A(s)) 1(In  ) A(s)
i < 1; 8i 2 f1;    ; ng F
F^ : (s)! (s+ 1) F^ ()
U
where  and  is
defined  as  in  (8).  To  the  authors' knowledge,  the  only
paper  treating  this  extension  theoretically  is  the
preliminary  work  in  [66].  There,  and  assuming  that
, it was established that  in (12)
is  replaced  by ,  where  is  a
certain left eigenvector of , given by
U =
1n1Tn
n
  (In   ￿) 1(In   diag(i))(In  C): (20)
F^ ()
F^ ()T1n = 1
(U)
U
U
In  particular,  the  eigenvector  has  all  positive
entries, satisfies , and is associated with the
simple  eigenvalue  at .  It  should  however  be  noted
that  is  not  necessarily  a  row-stochastic  matrix,  since
there is  no  guarantee  that  the  diagonal  entries  are  non-
negative,  though  it  does  have  nonnegative  off-diagonal
entries.  In  fact,  is  a  Metzler  matrix,  having  certain
special properties (see [47]).
4   Differences in expressed and private
opinion
It has  been well  recognised  in  the  literature  from so-
cial psychology, sociology and the like that individuals in-
teracting  with  one  another  may  on  occasions  express
opinions  which  are  not  consistent  with  their  privately
held opinions. This section is devoted to presenting a dy-
namic model  which incorporates  this  distinction of  opin-
ions.  This  distinction  often  arises  because  an  individual
feels pressured in a group situation to conform to a social
standard  or  norm.  Studies  identifying  existence  of  this
pressure,  for  the  most  part  were  initially  qualitative  in
nature and go back at least 70 years. It was found that in
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Fig. 2     Example of an emotional individual′s  . The function
  is  plotted  as  the  blue  line,  while  the  dotted  red  line
corresponds  to  the  original  model,    being  the  identity
mapping.
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factories,  group  pressure  can  force  individuals  with  high
productivity rates to lower their rates to match a desired
group  standard[67].  Almost  seventy  years  ago,  Asch[40]
conducted  what  is  one  of  the  most  seminal  experiments
on social  conformity,  and  this  work  is  of  great  motiva-
tional value for our own work. Peer punishment is  often
threatened  upon,  or  dealt  to,  individuals  who  deviate
from behaviour acceptable to the group, e.g., in a gang[68].
This pressure can occur even when the norm is destruct-
ive to the group[69].
Separately, the  idea  that  an individual  can simultan-
eously  hold  different  private  and  public  views  on  the
same  topic  has  been  extensively  documented.  It  was
found in one extensive field study that over one third of
jurors on criminal jury panels would have privately voted
against  the  final  decision  of  their  jury  panel[70].  Another
recent work coined the term preference falsification to de-
scribe a situation where an individual knowingly, or sub-
consciously,  expresses  an  altered  form  of  his/her  true
opinion[41]. Unpopular norms can be enforced even if most
individuals privately  dislike  them  due  to  fears  of  isola-
tion  and  exposure[50, 71].  The  term  pluralistic  ignorance
has been used to describe the outcome of the large scale
occurrence  of  discrepancies  between  private  and  public
opinions: individuals believe that the public majority sup-
port  position A (because  of  their  expressed  opinions,  as
reported in the news media perhaps) when in reality the
majority support (privately) position B, see [43, 72, 73].
Naturally, quantitative models have been proposed to
try and capture some of the above phenomena. Not sur-
prisingly,  a  number  of  models  exist  for  Asch's experi-
ments.  These  include  the  social  influence  model[74],  the
norm  influence  model[75],  and  the  other-total-ratio
model[76]; a number of these are summarised in the follow-
ing  meta-study[77]. However,  these  models  are  static,  be-
ing essentially curve fitting for data from the Asch exper-
iments. We are instead motivated to develop a dynamic-
al  agent-based  model  in  line  with  those  explored  in  the
previous sections, as these can give us richer insight into
how opinions can change over a network, including tem-
poral  change  which  has  been  noted  as  being  extremely
important[78].
4.1   EPO model
The model we present here is a novel one, inspired by
Solomon  Asch's seminal  experiments  on  conformity  un-
der  pressure[40], and the  many other  prior  works  we  dis-
cussed  above.  We  term it  the  expressed-private-opinions
(EPO) model.  The model  is  dynamic (as opposed to the
static ones discussed above) and seeks to study how dif-
ferences  between  an  individual's  expressed  and  private
opinions can arise[79]. In particular, we assume that an in-
dividual  expresses  an  opinion  which  is  the  individual's
private  opinion  altered  due  to  a  pressure  to  conform  to
the social network's average opinion. In other words, the
individual has some "resilience" to the pressure, but is not
unaffected by it. We also assume each individual remains
somewhat attached to the individual's initial opinion as in
the Friedkin-Johnsen  model.  While  the  notion  of  "stub-
bornness" has been commonplace in opinion dynamics for
some time,  e.g.,  in  the  Friedkin-Johnsen  model,  the  no-
tion of "resilience" is introduced specifically for our model.
i
xi(k)
k
x^i(t)
The mathematical form of the model can be seen as a
modest  adjustment  of  the  Friedkin-Johnsen  model.  The
key extension requires ascribing to the -th agent a scalar
parameter  termed  resilience,  in  the  following  way.  The
quantity  constitutes  the  agent's  private  opinion  at
time ,  and  there  is  now  a  second  quantity  associated
with the agent, namely, an expressed opinion  which
other agents learn of, and it is derived by combining the
private  opinion  and  the  effect  of  group  pressure  (effect-
ively,  the  social  network's average  opinion,  taking  obvi-
ously  the  expressed  rather  than  private  opinions  for  the
calculation  of  the  average).  This  means  that  the  update
equations are as follows:
xi(k + 1) = i[aiixi(k) +
nX
j 6=i
aij x^j(k)] + (1  i)xi(0)
(21a)
x^i(k) = ixi(k) + (1  i)x^avg(k   1) (21b)
aij i
xave(k) =
Pn
i=1
xi(k)
n
i 2 [0; 1]
i
i = 1
i = 0
where  and  are  the  same  as  that  defined  in
Section  2.2.  Here  is  called  the
public  opinion  as  consistent  with  [80]  and  is
termed  the  resilience,  i.e.,  the  ability  for  individual  to
withstand group pressure. It is instructive to observe that
if , then the individual is fully resilient to pressure
and the expressed and private opinions coincide, while if
,  the  individual's  own  opinion  is  totally
overwhelmed by the network's average opinion.
x^j(k)
xj(k)
i
i
x^i(k)
xi(k)
x^avg(k   1)
(1  i)x^avg(k   1)
Notice  that  (21a)  is  almost  identical  in  functional
form to the Friedkin-Johnsen model, but only , i.e.,
the  neighbour's  expressed  opinions,  and  not ,  are
available to individual . This is a key departure from ex-
isting  opinion  dynamics  models,  which  assume  a  single
opinion per individual per topic (some models such as [31,
32, 81] assume simultaneous discussion of multiple topics,
but an individual holds a single opinion per topic). From
(21b),  we  observe  that  individual 's  expressed  opinion
 is a convex combination of his or her private opin-
ion  and the public opinion in the previous round of
discussion, .  The motivation is  to capture the
normative pressure  to  conform that  arises  in  group situ-
ations[40, 42] that has been reported as driving an individu-
al  to  express  an opinion that  is  modified to  be closer  to
the  public  average  opinion.  One  can  therefore  consider
 as a  "force" that  is  exerted  due  to  a
pressure to conform.
Remark 2. It is perhaps remarkable that, despite the
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xi(k)
x^i(k)
xi; x^i
xi; x^i
many  different  advances  in  opinion  dynamics  modelling
over  the  past  several  decades,  almost  no  models  exist
which assume each individual has a private opinion 
and  expressed  opinion .  A  model  proposed  in  [50]
does assume separate private and expressed opinions, but
assumes  that  take  on  binary  values;  the  model  is
more appropriate  for  modelling  of  unpopular  norm  en-
forcement  as  opposed  to  the  evolution  of  opinions  that
take  on  values  in  a  continuous  interval.  The  influence,
susceptibility,  and  conformity  (ISC)  model  proposed  in
[23]  does  assume  each  individual  has  that  take  on
values in a continuous interval, and is perhaps the closest
in spirit to the one proposed in this paper. However, the
updating  mechanism  for  the  opinions  is  fundamentally
different,  and  the  ISC  model  is  extremely  complex  and
nonlinear; it  becomes  incredibly  difficult,  if  not  im-
possible,  to  study the  ISC model  analytically.  Moreover,
we propose our model while aiming for a balance between
simplicity for ease of analysis and complexity for captur-
ing a wider range of phenomena than current models are
able to. Last, a model with fewer parameters makes data
fitting and  parameter  estimation  in  experimental  valida-
tions  a  tractable  objective;  this  is  obvious  from the  fact
that the  Friedkin-Johnsen model  is  one  of  the  few mod-
els with extensive empirical data[27–29].
x^avg
The  reader  may  have  noticed  that  each  individual's
expressed opinion depends on a global quantity . For
small-sized and medium-sized networks, it is not difficult
to imagine that this is available. For large networks, such
information  might  come from opinion  polls,  or  trends  in
social  media.  However,  it  is  also possible to consider the
model with (21b) replaced by
x^i(k) = ixi(k) + (1  i)x^i;lavg(k   1) (22)
x^i;lavg =
P
j2Ni bij x^j
i
bij  0 Pnj=1 bij = 1
bij > 0, aij > 0 bij
i x^i;lavg
i
where  is the weighted average of the
expressed  opinions  of  individual 's  neighbours.  Here,
 are  general  weights  satisfying  and
.  (The  nonzero  corresponding  to  a
fixed  may all be equal). We call  the local public
opinion of individual . Much of the analysis and results,
detailed  in  the  following  subsection,  of  the  model  using
the global public opinion, i.e., (21b), can be carried over
to the local public opinion variant, i.e., (22); we refer the
reader to [79] for details of the differences.
4.2   Analysis of the dynamics
G[A]
Theoretical analysis of the model[79] has led to several
conclusions, which  are  illustrated  in  an  example  simula-
tion in Fig. 3. We now point out some of the most inter-
esting  results,  detailing  them in  a  more  informal  way in
order to put the focus on interpretation of the results in a
social  context.  Details  of  the exact analysis  are found in
[79]. The following conclusions were drawn under the as-
sumption  that  is  strongly  connected,  and  that
i; i 2 (0; 1) i 2 f1;    ; ng
x^ = [x^1;    ; x^n]T
x = [x1;    ; xn]T
 for  all .  We  are  particularly
interested in the evolution of the vector of expressed and
private opinions of the individuals,  and
, respectively.
x^ave
1)  The  combination  of  a)  pressure  to  conform to  the
public opinion , b) stubborn attachment to the indi-
vidual's initial opinion, and c) the strong connectedness of
the network,  means that a steady state is  reached expo-
nentially fast.
xi(1) 6= x^i(1) i 2 f1;    ; ng
2)  Interestingly,  in  general,  any  individual's  private
and  expressed  opinions  are  unequal  at  equilibrium,  i.e.,
 for every .
k V (k) V^ (k)
3) Let  us  define  disagreement  in  the  private  and  ex-
pressed opinions at time  as  and , respectively,
with
V (k) = max
i
xi(k) min
i
xi(k)
V^ (k) = max
i
x^i(k) min
i
x^i(k):
V (1) > V^ (1)
It turns out that there is greater disagreement among
the private opinions than expressed opinions at equilibri-
um,  i.e., .  This  is  due  to  the  effects  of  a
pressure  to  conform  to  a  social  norm:  people  are  more
willing  to  voice  agreement  in  a  social  network,  but  less
willing to shift their private opinions. The smallest inter-
val  containing  the  private  opinions  actually  “encloses”
the smallest interval containing the expressed opinions at
equilibrium.
V (1)
V^ (1)
4) It is possible to estimate a lower bound on the level
of disagreement in the final private opinions,  given
the level of disagreement in the expressed opinions ,
and an estimate of how resilient the individuals are to the
pressure  to  conform.  This  is  important,  because  large
spreads of  opinions  in  a  group  can  be  destructive  of  co-
hesiveness[82, 83],  and  if  known,  can  trigger  some  form of
remedial action.
5)  Though  certainly  not  apparent  in  the  figures,  the
steady state values of private and expressed opinions that
are reached, while dependent on the initial  private opin-
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Fig. 3     Evolution of opinions for a network of 8 individuals. The
opinions converge  to a  steady-state under mild assumptions on
the network connectivity.
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x(0)
x^(0)
x(1)
x^(1)
ions , are  actually  independent  of  the  initial  ex-
pressed opinions . That is, no matter what individu-
als may say at  the outset  of  a  discussion,  it  is  their  ini-
tial  private  opinions  only  which  determine  both  the
steady  state  private  and  expressed  opinions,  and
.
j
j
x^k(1)
k k 6= j
xj(1) j
6) The connectedness of the network leads to an indi-
vidual's  resilience  to  pressure  to  conform  having  a
"propagating effect". Changing an individual's level of re-
silience  to  this  pressure  leads  to  a  specific  pattern  of
changes  to  every  other  individual's  expressed  opinion  at
equilibrium. More specifically, if the resilience  of indi-
vidual  increases, so the individual becomes more reliant
on his/her expressed opinion and less reliant on the group
norm, the final expressed opinion  of any individu-
al  with , also becomes more influenced by the fi-
nal private opinion  of individual  than previously.
7) Whereas  in  the  standard  DeGroot  model,  the  dy-
namical behaviour has the property that the maximum of
all opinions is always monotone decreasing and the min-
imum of all such opinions is monotone increasing, no such
property  is  guaranteed  to  hold  for  either  expressed  or
private  opinions  in  the  EPO  model,  although  in  some
cases the property may be present.
4.3   Asch′s experiments and pluralistic ig-
norance
4.3.1   Asch′s experiments in the EPO model
8th
The EPO model has also been used to accurately pre-
dict and explain Asch's conformity experiments[40]. Asch's
conformity experiments  aimed  to  capture  how  an  indi-
vidual  reacts  when  he  or  she  is  faced  with  a  unanimous
group of other individuals who openly question his or her
belief  in an indisputable fact.  The original  experiment is
illustrated  in Fig. 4,  where  the  individuals  have  to  judge
the lengths of lines, with 7 individuals (termed confeder-
ates  in  later  literature)  unanimously  picking  the  wrong
answer by private  a  priori  arrangement  with  the  experi-
menter.  The reaction of the , test,  individual was re-
corded. Some test individuals would bend to the pressure
of the unanimous group and also select the incorrect an-
swer  while  others  would  resist;  further,  of  those  who
bend, it  may  be  that  their  private  and  expressed  opin-
ions  bend in  a  dynamic process,  or  it  may be that  their
private opinion remains little  changed,  whereas  their  ex-
pressed  opinion  changes  substantially.  We  label  without
1; 1
x^c(k) xc(k)
x^c(k) = xc(k) k  0
x1(k); x^1(k)
x1(0) = x^1(0)
x1(0) = x^1(0) 6= x^c(0) = xc(0)
1 1
loss of generality the test individual as individual 1 of the
network, and  show  that  each  reaction  of  the  test  indi-
vidual  recorded  by  Asch  can  be  accurately  predicted  by
different  values  for  the  parameter  pair , i.e.,  sus-
ceptibility to influence (or lack of stubbornness) and resi-
lience to the group pressure (see [79] for details). Here, we
summarise the outcomes in Table 1. In particular, we de-
note the confederate opinions as  and , and en-
force that  for all . This is because the
confederates were told before the experiment to be stub-
born and openly express belief in the wrong answer. The
opinions  of  the  test  individual,  are  set  so
that  is the correct answer. This means that
,  (and  of  course  as  time
evolves  the  test  individual's  opinions  in  general  move
away  from  the  initial  values). Table  1 details  how  the
opinions of the test individual evolve depending on his or
her susceptibility and resilience parameters,  and .
4.3.2   Pluralistic ignorance in the EPO model
Pluralistic  ignorance,  as  introduced  at  the  beginning
of  Section 4,  is  a  social  phenomenon where  the majority
of  a  population  privately  reject  an  opinion  position,  but
people believe there is majority support for that position,
e.g.,  in  the  1960s,  white  Americans  misidentified  how
much  support  there  was  for  racial  segregation[72].  In
Fig. 5, our model shows that stubborn extremists (zealots)
placed at well connected nodes in a scale-free network can
create massive pluralistic ignorance in the general popula-
tion. Not only does this create confusion and misinforma-
tion about the true desires of the population, it is known
that  large  differences  in  expressed  and  private  opinions
that  are  sustained  for  a  long  time  can  foster  discontent
among individuals, leading to unexpected and drastic ac-
tions[82, 83].
 
Table 1    Types of test individuals, their associated parameters and the individual′s opinion change
1 1 Change in opinions
Independent Low High x1(1)  x^1(1)  x1(0)
Yielding, distortion of judgment High (0; 1)Any value in  x1(1)  x^1(1)  x^c(0)
Yielding, distortion of action Low Low x1(1)  x1(0) x^1(1)  x^c(0), but 
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Fig. 4     Example  of  the Asch  experiment,  with  an  illustrative
influence  network  of  eight  individuals.  The  individuals  are
required  to  openly  discuss  the  length  of  lines,  and  state  their
individual beliefs as to which one of A, B, C has the same length
as the green  line. Clearly A  is equal  in  length to the green  line.
The  confederates  (seven blue  individuals) unanimously  express
belief in the same wrong answer, e.g., B.
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We have also verified that our model can capture the
pluralistic ignorance  phenomenon  observed  in  field  stud-
ies by Prentice and Miller[43], of attitudes to consumption
of  alcohol  on  Princeton  University  campus.  In  [43],  the
authors surveyed  a  large  cohort  of  undergraduate  stu-
dents,  asking each of  them their  opinions on the alcohol
drinking culture on campus. Several notable aspects were
recorded, each of which appears when we place the study
in the framework of our model.
i
i
Prentice and Miller[43] found that men and women re-
sponded  differently  to  sustained  discrepancies  in  private
and  expressed  opinions  over  time  (the  presence  of  time
evolution  was  heavily  stressed  in  the  study,  and  helps
support  the  relevance  of  our  model  over  existing  static
models  for  conformity).  Women  continued  to  display
pluralistic ignorance over time. At the start of the survey,
women  generally  were  uncomfortable  with  the  drinking
culture  (their  private  opinions),  but  assumed  everyone
else  was  comfortable  with  it  (the  expressed  opinions  of
others).  After  several  months,  this  had  not  changed  by
much.  On  the  other  hand,  men  at  the  beginning  of  the
survey  also  returned  similar  opinion  profiles  as  women,
but  after  several  months,  had  become  affected  by  the
pluralistic  ignorance.  In  particular,  after  several  months,
men reported that they were comfortable with the drink-
ing  culture  (their  private  opinions),  and  also  assumed
everyone  else  was  comfortable  with  it  (the  expressed
opinions  of  others).  In  other  words,  the  private  opinions
of most male students changed over time due to the plur-
alistic  ignorance,  whereas  those  of  female  students  did
not.  In  our  model,  both  male  and  female  students  had
low resilience , while male and female students had high
and low susceptibility , respectively. Both types of stu-
dents could  co-exist  in  the  same  network,  as  was  ob-
served in the field experiment.
x^i;lavg
x^avg
By way  of  general  comment,  we  note  that  the  influ-
ence  of  zealots  can  be  substantially  affected  by  several
network  properties:  the  first  is  the  topology,  such  as
whether the network is a small-world network, or a scale-
free network. It turns out that in a small world network,
zealots do not have to reach far to affect a nonzealot, al-
though  the  zealot's  influence  may  be  diluted  because
nonzealots have a number of other nonzealot neighbours.
In a scale-free network, there tend to be nodes with very
high  degree,  and  if,  and  perhaps  only  if,  zealots  can  be
deliberately positioned at  such a node,  they can be very
powerful.  Whether  average  public  opinions  seen  by  an
agent  are  local  or  global  is  also  relevant,  i.e.,  or
 as in (22) or (21b). If an agent seeks just the aver-
age  opinion  of  his/her  neighbours,  or  one  and  two-hop
neighbours, he may see no average opinion affected by a
zealot.  The  influence  of  zealots  will  take  time  to  spread
out, and perhaps become attenuated in the process.
4.4   Future work on the EPO model
A  number  of  exciting  future  directions  exist  for  the
EPO model, which is still very new. Aside from the usu-
al extensions  to  consider  time-varying  interactions,  gos-
sip-based algorithms and incorporation of other accepted
features such as bounded-confidence or antagonistic inter-
actions, we briefly cover two specific extensions to inter-
esting social phenomena.
Phenomena and behaviour related to pluralistic ignor-
ance are of particular interest in studying how misinform-
ation spreads through high profile  media figures,  or  hos-
tile  bot  accounts  on  social  media  (such  as  the  Twitter
bots of  a  foreign  country  commenting  on  political  mat-
ters).  We  also  expect  this  to  be  closely  linked  with  the
concept of the spiral of silence[80, 84], which is a social phe-
nomenon where  an  individual  is  more  likely  to  stop  ex-
pressing  his  or  her  opinion  if  that  individual  perceives
(rightly  or  wrongly)  that  everyone  else  is  moving  away
from his or her opinion. We hope that study and develop-
ment of these models (including incorporation of a spiral
of  silence  mechanism,  perhaps  by  inclusion  of  an  event-
based communication component) will reveal to us deep-
er insight about the role extremists play in creating a di-
vergence in the private and expressed opinions of the gen-
eral population,  and  provide  some  guidance  for  develop-
ing effective countermeasures. For example, it is not im-
mediately clear whether it is better to 1) introduce a new
set of extremists that are on the opposite side of the opin-
ion spectrum to the original zealots (which might risk po-
larising the  network),  or  2)  spread  more  moderate  opin-
ions  (which  might  risk  being  lost  in  the  presence  of  the
original zealots).
It would also be of great interest to study such mod-
els for online social networks, where the 1-9-90 rule is pre-
valent in many discussion forums. Roughly speaking, 1%
of users  create  content,  9% of  users  participate  by post-
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ing opinions, and 90% of users do not participate at all[85];
how do the private opinions of the 90% evolve as a result
of  the  10%  expressing  opinions,  and  what  happens  if
these ratios change?
5   Opinion dynamics on logically related
issues
[ 1; 1]
i xi = [x
1
i ; x
2
i ]
T:
x1i
i
x2i
i
i Ci A = (aij)
What do  we  mean  by  the  term  “logically  related  is-
sues”?  We  provide  an  example.  Suppose  that  a  topic  is
the  truthfulness  of  a  statement,  and  a  positive  (respect-
ively  negative)  opinion  value  indicates  belief  that  the
statement is true (respectively false), with the magnitude
of the opinion value indicating strength of conviction. For
this  section,  we  assume  the  opinions  lie  in . Con-
sider two topics  being simultaneously discussed;  1)  men-
tally challenging  tasks  are  just  as  exhausting  as  physic-
ally challenging tasks and 2) that Go and chess should be
considered sports in the Olympics.  Clearly a person who
believes topic 1 is true is more likely to believe topic 2 is
true.  Let  individual 's  opinion  vector  be 
(We use  the  bold  face  to  distinguish  this  situation  from
the  earlier  problems  which  restrict  consideration  at  any
one time to a single  topic.)  For topic  1,  if  is  positive
(respectively  negative),  then  individual  believes men-
tally  challenging  tasks  are  just  as  exhausting  (respect-
ively  not  as  exhausting)  as  physically  challenging  tasks.
For topic 2,  if  is  positive (respectively negative) then
individual  believes  (to  some  degree)  Go  and  chess
should  be  considered  (respectively  not  considered)  an
Olympic  sports.  To  capture  in  a  model  how  individuals
interact  when  interdependent  topics  are  involved,
Parsegov et al.[31, 32] proposed to combine the idea of the
DeGroot model  with the notion of  a logic  matrix,  which
captures logical interdependence of the topics, and which
for  individual  is  denoted  as .  With  a
stochastic matrix capturing the network effect of interac-
tion among individuals as in the DeGroot model (see Sec-
tion 2.2), one has
xi(k + 1) =
nX
j=1
aijCixj(k): (23)
i
To  clarify  the  purpose  of  the  logic  matrix,  consider
temporarily  an  individual  with  no  neighbours,  so  that
(23) becomes
xi(k + 1) = Cixi(k) (24)
i
and consider the above mentioned example regarding Go
and  chess  as  Olympic  sports.  An  individual  may  hold
the belief that an event can only be an Olympic sport if it
is exhausting. One possible logic matrix is given by
Ci =

1 0
0:7 0:3

: (25)
xi(0) = [1; 0:7]T i
x1i (1) = x
1
i (0) x
2
i (1) = 0:7x
1
i (0) + 0:3x
2
i (0) = 0:49
i
i
x2i (k)  0:7 0:49
i
i
limk!1 xi(k) = [1; 1]T i
i
x1i (0) =  0:8
limk!1 xi(k) = [ 0:8; 0:8]T i
Suppose  that ,  i.e.,  initially  agent 
believes  mentally  challenging  tasks  are  as  exhausting  as
physically challenging tasks, but does not believe Go and
chess  should  be  Olympic  sports.  According  to  (24),
 and .
That  is  agent 's evaluation  on  the  logical  interdepend-
ence of topic 2 on topic 1 (because agent  holds the view
that an  event  can  only  be  an  Olympic  sport  if  it  is  ex-
hausting)  causes  to  shift  from  to ;  thus,
agent 's opinion on topic 2 in one step has been altered
due  to 's  opinion  on  topic  1.  Eventually,
,  and  agent  comes  to  believe
(after some internal reflection) that Go and chess should
be Olympic sports. On the other hand, if agent  does not
initially believe mentally challenging tasks are as exhaust-
ing  as  physically  challenging  tasks,  e.g., ,
then  and  agent  believes
chess should not be an Olympic sport.
jAnother individual  might take the view that Go and
chess being Olympic sports implies that mentally challen-
ging tasks are to some degree as exhausting as physically
challenging tasks and so may have
Cj =

0:5 0:5
0:7 0:3

: (26)
12 jThe  nonzero  entry  indicates  that  agent  views
topic 1 as being logically dependent on topic 2.
Ci Cj
Ci
Ci
[ 1; 1]
While the above  and  are row-stochastic, we do
not  in  general  require  to  be  row-stochastic  (though
other constraints will apply, depending on whether we are
working  with  continuous-time  or  discrete-time  models).
For convenience, we will restrict attention to one possibil-
ity,  namely  discrete-time  models.  What  properties  then
should a matrix  have? It is crucial that in the absence
of inputs from other individuals, i.e., with dynamics (24),
an individual's own belief system should be consistent, in
the  sense  of  giving  rise  to  a  steady-state  opinion  vector.
Thus, (24) for arbitrary initial conditions with each entry
confined  to  should have  a  transient  solution,  in-
cluding  a  limiting  solution,  such  that  the  transient  and
limit also  have  entries  confined  to  this  interval.  The  re-
quisite conditions are set out in detail in [31, 86], and we
report them here in the following assumption. (A parallel
restriction applies in continuous time of course[81].)
Ci iAssumption 2. The matrix , for each , has either
Ci
1)  A semi-simple4 eigenvalue  1.  All  other  eigenvalues
of  have modulus strictly less than 1, or
Ci2) All eigenvalues of  have modulus less than 1.
i 2 I p 2 J Pmq=1 jcpq;ij = 1
p cpq;i = 0
q 6= p cpp;i = 1
Moreover, for all  and , . If
topic  is independent of all other topics, i.e.,  for
all , then . The diagonal entries are nonneg-
4By  semi-simple,  we  mean  that  the  geometric  and  algebraic
multiplicities  are  the  same.  Equivalently,  the  Jordan  blocks  of
the eigenvalue 1 are all 1 by 1.
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cpp;i  0ative, .
5.1   Disagreement due to logical differences
Ci
Ci
Ci
Ci
Unsurprisingly, if all  are the same, from an algeb-
raic point of view, equation (23) for the entire network is
rather  easy  to  analyse,  with  the  aid  of  Kronecker
products. Indeed, Parsegov et al.[31] considers networks of
individuals  all  having the same  (along with other as-
pects  including  stubbornness  as  described  by  the
Friedkin-Johnsen  model,  see  (3)).  The  work[32] does con-
sider  heterogeneous , but  focuses  on  obtaining  conver-
gence rather  than  investigating  the  effects  of  heterogen-
eity. Moreover, the stability result in [32] requires at least
one  individual  to  have  some  stubbornness.  Our  work[86]
has sought to focus on what happens to the final opinion
distribution when the  are distinct, and thus makes the
assumption that the individuals are not stubborn; we now
record  several  key  outcomes  which  are  different  from
those in [31, 32].
Ci
i
Ci
Notice that the matrix  in (25) is lower triangular.
This is common in the social context of the situation, re-
flecting  the  fact  that  individual 's  belief  system  flows
from one or  more axioms,  or  truths which they consider
to be indisputable. Our work begins by focusing on such
lower triangular .
G[A]
Ci
First,  we  establish  the  possibly  nonobvious  fact  that
all models  of  this  type  are  convergent,  given  the  stand-
ard connectivity condition in opinion dynamics models of
having  strongly  connected  and  aperiodic,  and
Assumption  2  imposed  on  the  logic  matrix ,  arising
from  the  need  for  (24)  to  describe  a  consistent  belief
structure.
Next,  we  consider  the  question  of  whether  consensus
on  individual  topics  can  be  achieved.  Suppose  to  begin
that  there  are  two  topics  under  discussion,  and  that
topic  2  depends  on topic  1  but  topic  1  does  not  depend
on topic 2, for every individual. Thus,
Ci =

1 0
c21;i c22;i

: (27)
The major result for this case is as follows. A proof of
this result can be found in [86].
G(A)Theorem 2. Suppose the graph  is strongly con-
nected  and  that  individuals  are  discussing  two  logically
interdependent  topics  according to  (23).  Suppose  further
that the logic matrices of all individuals are of the form of
(27), with Assumption 2 holding. Then:
1) Consensus of topic 1 always occurs;
Ci
2) For almost all initial conditions, consensus of topic 2
occurs  if  and  only  if  no  two  21  entries  of  the  set  of 
have different signs.
Ci
Evidently, if all individuals have the same sign for the
21 entry of  their  matrix,  i.e.,  there are no competing
logical  interdependence  structures,  then  the  dynamic
changes in each individual's collection of opinions are pro-
p; q c21;p c21;q
duced by consistent action of  the logic  matrix (the indi-
vidual's belief  system)  and  the  network  (the  other  indi-
viduals). As a result, consensus is reached in steady state
on both topics. On the other hand, if there are two indi-
viduals  for which  and  have opposite signs,
then consensus will not be achieved on topic 2. Evidently,
major  but  not  complete  differences  in  belief  structures
will not destroy consensus.
Ci
Ci = C^
Cj = ~C
C^ 6= ~C
c21;i c22;i
i
i = 1; 2;    ; 5
Ci
j = 6
Cj c21;j c21;i
Ci
This is  illustrated in Figs. 6 and 7,  where there are 6
individuals discussing 2 topics, with  taking the form of
(27). In Fig. 6, individuals 1, 2, 3 have the same 
matrix,  while  individuals  4,  5,  6  have  the  same 
matrix.  The  two  logic  matrices  satisfy  but  have
the same sign pattern;  is negative and  is posit-
ive for all . Fig. 6 shows that the individuals reach a con-
sensus for each of topics 1 and 2, with the consensus val-
ues for the two topics being different. Fig. 7 shows a sim-
ulation  where  five  individuals  have  the
same ,  and whose  opinions  on topic  2  are  represented
by the solid blue lines. The sixth individual , whose
opinion  on  topic  2  is  indicated  by  the  dashed  blue  line,
has  with  having opposite sign to . As can be
seen, opinions converge to a persistent disagreement, even
for the five individuals with the same logic matrix .
Ci
The situation with three or more topics is more subtle.
While  convergence  can  be  established  much  as  for  the
case of two topics, the question of consensus is only par-
tially resolved, see [86]. Suppose that all  have the form
Ci =
24 1 0 0c21;i c22;i 0
c31;i c32;i c33;i
35 : (28)
Then discrepancies in signs in the second row between
corresponding elements will  in general  prevent consensus
from being reached on topic 3 as well as on topic 2, sug-
gesting that  the  cascade  structure  has  a  prominent  im-
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pact. Also minor differences between individuals of value
(even without sign difference) in any of the entries of the
third row can lead to lack of consensus in topic 3. Thus
there is a significant distinction to be drawn between the
two topic case and the three (or more) topic case.
The  failure  of  consensus  is  not  just  minor;  there  can
arise a  diverse  disagreement  of  opinions  from minor  dif-
ferences in the values of the entries. In other words, when
consensus fails to be achieved for a given topic using the
model in (23), the network tends to settle into a state of
strong  diversity.  Recall  from  the  Introduction  that  on
strongly connected graphs, some models give rise to weak
diversity  (e.g.,  Hegselmann-Krause,  and  Altafini)  while
other models give rise to strong diversity (e.g., Friedkin-
Johnsen), and it is strong diversity which is of greater in-
terest. Our reported findings are of particular interest be-
cause strong diversity in the final opinions, e.g., in Fig. 7,
can apparently  be  attributed  to  differences  in  logical  in-
terdependence  between  individuals' belief  systems.  To
elaborate, strong diversity occurs even though each indi-
vidual  uses  (23)  in  an  attempt  to  bring  their  opinions
closer  together,  and  there  is  no  presence  of
stubbornness[26],  bounded-confidence[10], negative  influ-
ence[16], or  the  other  usual  processes  to  which  disagree-
ment may be attributed.
5.2   Results for continuous-time model
As  a  general  rule,  much  the  same  set  of  conclusions
arise in social network modelling whether one uses a con-
tinuous-time or  discrete-time  model.  In  the  case  of  mul-
tiple interdependent topics however, we need to note one
clear difference as identified in [81].  When one moves to
continuous time, one can consider a time scale associated
with  the  internal  cognitive  process  for  an  individual  to
obtain  a  consistent  belief  system  (i.e.,  the  continuous
time version  of  (24)),  and one  can consider  a  time scale
associated with the individual's interactions with other in-
dividuals,  thereby  causing  some  modification,  and  with
the  aim  of  achieving  consensus  between  individuals.  In
the event that the second time scale dominates the first,
we  have  been  able  to  show  theoretically,  and  validated
the conclusion with simulations, that instability may res-
ult.  Put  another  way,  one  must  not  rush  the  process  of
arriving at consensus between individuals when there are
multiple related  topics  to  consider.  People  can  only  ad-
just to the opinions of others so fast while also trying to
secure logical  consistency: if  one tries to respond to oth-
ers' opinions faster,  fracture and instability may result  –
at  least  in  the  mathematical  model.  This  phenomenon
may be  related  to  cognitive  overload,  in  which  an  indi-
vidual's internal capacity for processing external informa-
tion can  become  overwhelmed  if  that  information  is  re-
ceived at a high density.  As a result,  the individual  suf-
fers  a  major  decrease  in  decision-making  and  cognitive
abilities[87, 88].
The possibility of instability just identified cannot be
duplicated in a discrete-time model. While perhaps para-
doxical,  there  is  an  explanation.  Because  the  fact  a
sampling time exists in a discrete-time model sets an up-
per  limit  on  the  speed  with  which  change  can  be
achieved,  and  the  rate  at  which  interactions  with  other
individuals affects an individual's opinion cannot become
an arbitrarily large multiple of the rate at which the indi-
vidual's belief system processes information.
5.3   Future work on the opinion dynamics
of logically related issues
It  will  be  evident  from  the  preceding  material  that
there  are  significant  gaps  in  our  understanding  of  the
opinion dynamics  when  individuals  are  discussing  logic-
ally related issues. One flagged above is to provide a com-
prehensive theory when there are three or more topics in
any  study  of  multiple  related  topics.  Furthermore,  we
hope to  explore  other  logic  matrix  structures.  For  ex-
ample,  irreducible  logic  matrices  appear  to  not  have  the
same tendency to generate disagreement even when there
is heterogeneity. This may provide insight into which be-
lief  structures  are  more  robust  in  generating  consensus,
and which belief structures are more likely to lead to dis-
agreement. Eventually, one would like to have a compre-
hensive account whereby, given a certain logical interde-
pendence structure, we are able to precisely quantify the
impacts of the logical structure on the final opinion distri-
bution and identify which topics are likely to reach a con-
sensus,  and  which  topics  will  show a  strong  diversity  of
opinions.
In a separate direction, it would be of interest to con-
tinue  investigations  on  the  continuous-time  counterpart
model.  A comprehensive  convergence result  for  networks
where individuals have some stubbornness is still lacking.
The interplay  between  stubbornness  and  cognitive  over-
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load is  also  of  interest;  simulations  and  preliminary  res-
ults  have  suggested that  high levels  of  stubbornness  can
stabilise an opinion dynamical system in which absence of
stubbornness  would  result  in  instability.  Moreover,  the
same questions  on  the  effects  of  heterogeneity  in  the  lo-
gic  matrices  considered  in  the  discrete-time  model  are
equally worthy of study for the continuous-time model.
6   Conclusions
The oldest dynamical models for the evolution of opin-
ions among a group of individuals go back some 60 years.
On the time scales associated with scientific research, this
corresponds  to  many  generations,  but  some  might  say
progress has not been fast, at least till recent times. More
recent progress has been assisted by applications drivers.
The desire to understand matters such as how customers
or employees are motivated,  or how bots or zealots  may
seek to  disrupt  an  electoral  process,  are  obvious  ex-
amples which have stimulated many social  scientists,  in-
cluding  of  course  those  working  quite  independently  of
engineers. At the same time recent developments in sys-
tems and control oriented towards studying networks, of-
ten in the first instance networks of physical entities such
as robots, unmanned airborne vehicles and the like, have
been  another  contributor  stimulating  great  interest  and
at times rapid development in opinion dynamics, at least
in the control community.
Many, but of  course not all,  developments in opinion
dynamics  need  to  be  grounded  in  rigorous  mathematics,
as arises  in  fields  such  as  control  theory,  especially  net-
worked  control  theory.  Developments  also  need  to  make
contact  with  the  experimental  side  of  opinion  dynamics,
for  motivation  and  for  validation.  The  raw  material  for
much  of  this  already  exists  in  the  literature,  where  one
can  find  descriptions  of  laboratory  experiments  or  field
studies.  Much  of  this  literature  however  studies  a  static
situation (perhaps a steady state situation at the end of a
dynamic evolution), in contrast perhaps to the predisposi-
tion  of  a  control  scientist  or  engineer  interested  in  time
evolution of a system or its dynamic behaviour as well as
its long term steady state.
Control engineering also has a long experience of seek-
ing parsimonious models of physical systems, i.e., models
with  often  fewer  parameters  than  might  be  necessary  to
cover every single aspect of the system, but models which
at the same time are useful for explanatory and predict-
ive  purposes.  A  focus  on  keeping  models  simple  in  the
sense of minimising the number of parameters is likely to
be important in future developments of opinion dynamics.
In this  paper,  we  have  covered  three  different  exten-
sions of the basic DeGroot model. In relation to the first,
the evolution of social power, we stress that there are ex-
perimental  studies  (not  conducted  by  us,  but  referenced
in  this  paper)  which  validate  the  model.  It  passes  the
simplicity test.  And  we  have  indicated  how,  with  addi-
tional modest parameters, behavioural characteristics can
be used to build a more sophisticated model, although we
lack experimental validation of this extended model. The
second  extension  of  the  basic  DeGroot  and  Friedkin-
Johnsen  models,  dealing  with  differing  expressed  and
private  opinions,  is  a  dynamic  model  that  again  passes
the simplicity test, in some contrast perhaps to models in
the  social  science  literature  of  greater  complexity  and
which pay  less  attention  to  conclusions  potentially  ob-
tainable  by  system  theoretic  tools.  The  ability  of  this
model to  capture  much  that  has  been  previously  repor-
ted in the literature is striking. Then, we have examined
a  situation  frequently  encountered  in  real  life,  but  not
greatly  examined  yet  in  terms  of  opinion  dynamics,  i.e.,
the evolution of multiple opinions on logically related top-
ics  within  a  group of  individuals.  This  work is  both less
theoretically  developed  and  less  supported  currently  by
laboratory or field data.
It  is  appropriate  to  recall  the  caution  that  for  large-
scale  networks,  the  DeGroot  model  and  models  derived
from  it  may  not  be  as  effective  as  kinetic  models.  Self-
evidently, the weighting parameters in the influence mat-
rix will never be all obtainable, and for networks of even
1 000 agents,  the  notion  of  working  with  a  million  para-
meters  in  the  influence  matrix  is  challenging,  to  say  the
least.  One  must  therefore  be  aware  of  the  scenarios  for
which  agent-based  models  are,  and  are  not,  appropriate
for modelling  of  opinion  dynamics.  Leaving  aside  the  is-
sue of  network size,  we hope we have made the case for
the relevance of  the work,  for the power of  the dynamic
models,  and for  the  sheer  volume of  scientific  challenges
still  remaining to be addressed,  even when in this  paper
we have focused on just a few of the recent advances.
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